This paper gauges if, and how, institutional arrangements are correlated with the use of macroprudential policy instruments. Using data from 39 countries, the paper evaluates policy response time in various types of institutional arrangements for macroprudential policy and finds that the macroprudential framework that gives the central bank an important role is associated with more timely use of macroprudential policy instruments. Policymakers may also tend to use macroprudential instruments more quickly if the ability to conduct monetary policy is somehow constrained. This finding points to the importance of coordination between macroprudential and monetary policy. JEL Classification Numbers: G28, E58
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I. INTRODUCTION
The global financial crisis has underscored the need for a new macroprudential policy framework to prevent the buildup of systemic financial risks. In many countries, efforts are under way to establish such a policy framework by making new, or improving on existing, institutional arrangements. In the quest for a new policy framework, a natural question to ask is: what type of institutional arrangement is most effective? While no one size fits all, previous research by the IMF indicates that it is desirable for an institutional arrangement to provide for the timely use of macroprudential policy tools, which are shown to be effective in countering the cyclicality in the financial system. 2 This paper attempts to gauge if institutional arrangements can affect the timely use of macroprudential policy instruments. This is achieved by evaluating policy response time under different institutional arrangements in a cross-country study of 39 countries, using newly updated data based on the 2010 IMF survey on Financial Stability and Macroprudential Policy (see Appendix). Policy response in this paper refers to the use of macroprudential instruments to address risks that contribute to the buildup of systemic vulnerabilities over time, or the time dimension of systemic risk.
A key assumption of the paper is that all observed policy actions are warranted by emerging risks. No attempt is made to judge when or whether policy action should be taken, which is beyond the scope of this paper. The assumption seems plausible for policy instruments used to address the time dimension of systemic risk, i.e., tightened in the upswing of the credit cycle and loosened in the downswing. To ensure that this assumption holds, all instruments in the sample are carefully examined to exclude those that seem to be unrelated to the credit cycle and have a microprudential focus. As it turns out, these instances are extremely rare in the sample.
The paper finds a negative correlation between policy response time and the central bank's involvement in the macroprudential policy framework. This finding supports the Fund's position that "the central bank needs to play an important role" in the macroprudential policy framework. 3 While not purporting to show that a short response time is, in and of itself, effective or even desirable, the finding is consistent with previous Fund research showing that an institutional arrangement can enhance the timeliness of policy responses if it (i) facilitates systemic risk monitoring and identification, and (ii) fosters cross-agency policy coordination. The central bank is in a unique position to do both.
II. MEASURING INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
Real-life institutional arrangements have certain distinguishing dimensions. The Fund's previous work has identified five such dimensions from institutional arrangements in place or being developed around the world: 4 (i) the degree of institutional integration between the central bank and financial regulatory/supervisory functions; (ii) the ownership of the macroprudential mandate; (iii) the role of the government (treasury) in macroprudential policy; (iv) the degree of organizational separation of decision-making and control over instruments; and (v) the existence of a coordinating body for macroprudential policy.
These dimensions may be quantified to indicate the respective roles of the central bank and the government in various institutional arrangements. To that end, this paper constructs three indices: a macroprudential index (MaPP) indicating the role of the central bank in the macroprudential policy framework; a microprudential index (MiPP) indicating the degree of involvement of the central bank in prudential regulation and supervision; 5 and a government index (MoF) indicating the degree of involvement of the government in macroprudential policy. 6 The indices measure de facto arrangement and are not mutually exclusive. 7 The indices assign a score of 1 to 4, with a higher value indicating a more important role:

The MaPP index:
1 -The financial stability/macroprudential policy mandate is shared by multiple agencies including the central bank, but there is no coordination body, 2 -The mandate is shared by multiple agencies including the central bank, and the central bank is a member of a coordination body, 3 -The central bank supervises the banking sector and part of the nonbank financial sector, and 4 -The central bank supervises the entire financial sector.

The MoF index:
1 -There is no macroprudential policy coordination body or the government is not a member, 2 -The government is a member/observer of the policy coordination body, 3 -The government co-chairs the policy coordination body with other agencies, and 4 -The government chairs the policy coordination body.
The indices thus constructed show some common features of institutional arrangements across countries. For instance, the central bank shares the financial stability/macroprudential policy mandate with other agencies as a member of a policy coordination body (2 in MaPP) in a majority of countries in the sample (Table 1) . Similarly, the central bank has prudential regulation functions in a majority of the sample countries, with 41 percent having responsibility for banking supervision (2 in MiPP), 18 percent for banking and some nonbank supervision (3 in MiPP), and 8 percent for all financial regulation and supervision (4 in MiPP). The government also tends to share the financial stability/macroprudential policy mandate with other agencies and plays a leading role in only a minority of the sample countries (4 in MoF). A full tabulation of the results is presented in Table 4 . 
III. MEASURING RESPONSE TIME
Response time measures elapsed time between the emergence of a risk and the subsequent use of a policy instrument. While the use of a policy instrument is usually well documented, it is not always clear when a risk has emerged. The judgment of risks depends on the policymaker's risk tolerance, and there does not seem to be a universally accepted level of risk tolerance across countries. Given the difficulty in identifying the emergence of risks, this paper uses significant and distinctive changes in the behavior of a risk variable as the start point of response time. These changes are identified using two different approaches, i.e., a break-in-trend analysis and a distance from peak/trough analysis, both providing a benchmark for measuring response time without the need to assess the risk tolerance. A third approach, a threshold analysis, is also tried, but it involves judgment on the emergence of risks and is included only as an experiment. 

Approach 2: distance-from-peak/trough analysis. Under this approach, a turning point (peak/trough) in the path of a risk variable represents a change in its behavior and is used as the start point of response time. The turning points are estimated from a six-month moving average of seasonally adjusted data. Like Approach 1, this approach is capable of ranking policy responsiveness under different institutional arrangements by providing a common yardstick that is independent of any judgment of risk tolerance or when the risks emerged ( Figure 2 ).
8 Judgments can be arbitrary, and the arbitrariness may limit the usefulness of this approach.
9 The Markov switching model provides an alternative. As it turns out, however, it was not able to identify two stages in the risk variables for many countries in the sample. 
Approach 3: threshold analysis. Under this approach, a risk is considered to have emerged only after the risk variable crosses a certain threshold, and the threshold is used as the start point of response time. Following previous work by the Fund, a growth rate (yoy) that is 1.5 standard deviations from the historical mean during the sample period is chosen as the threshold.
10
The date corresponding to this threshold is then selected as the start point for calculating response time. 10 See IMF (2012). The GFSR also used 5 percent (yoy) growth in credit/GDP as a threshold. In the calculation of response time, credit and credit growth are used as the risk variable. Credit is widely considered an important variable to focus on for systemic risk oversight.
11
Most of the countries responding to the IMF survey have used macroprudential policy to target credit or credit growth.
12
Using credit and credit growth as the risk variable to calculate response time also has the advantage of covering the largest number of instances of macroprudential policy instruments being used. On the other hand, response time calculated for other risk variables, such as leverage, liquidity and house prices, based on the use of instruments to address credit-related risks may not be accurate.
13
The calculation of response time for these other risk variables based on instruments used to target them turns out not to be feasible as very few macroprudential policy instruments were used to specifically target these risks. This paper uses eight macroprudential policy instruments in calculating response time: caps on the LTV, caps on the DTI, limits on foreign currency lending, ceilings on credit/credit growth, reserve requirements, capital requirements, provisioning requirements, and restrictions on profit distribution (see Appendix).
The estimated response time reflects policy action taken in both the upswing and downswing of the credit cycle. The sample includes monthly data from 39 countries that used macroprudential instruments during the period of 2008-2011, in which both tightening and loosening of macroprudential instruments occurred. Thus, response time is calculated in a two-step process: the response times for the upswing and downswing are measured separately and then averaged to arrive at the final number. If an instrument is used multiple times in either the upswing or the downswing, the first time of its implementation is used in the calculation of response time.
The calculated average response times seem close for Approaches 1 and 2 but not for Approach 3. The results under Approach 3 excluded more than half of the countries in the sample, for which response time could not be calculated. These are countries where policy action is taken well before the threshold is reached, and excluding them makes the average response time under Approach 3 the longest among the three approaches (Figure 4 ). The fact that many countries take action before a threshold is reached seems to indicate that the assumption of a common risk threshold across countries, such as one represented by a growth 11 See, for example, Arregui et al (2013) . 12 According to the 2010 IMF survey, country authorities have used macroprudential instruments to address four broad categories of systemic risk: (i) risks generated by strong credit growth and credit-driven asset price inflation; (ii) risks arising from excessive leverage and the consequent deleveraging; (iii) systemic liquidity risks; and (iv) risks related to large and volatile capital flows. See Lim et al (2011) for details. 13 Credit/GDP is another risk variable, but it tends to be negatively correlated with GDP growth. See, for example, Repullo et al (2010) and Repullo and Saurina (2012) . As a result, policy action based on credit/GDP tends to be procyclical. According to the IMF survey, most countries use credit growth, rather than credit/GDP, as a guide for policy actions. Therefore, this paper does not use credit/GDP in calculating response time. rate 1.5 standard deviations from the historical mean, is arbitrary and unrealistic. 14 A threshold estimated from cross-country panel data may be, on average, a good indicator of the likelihood of an impending financial crisis, but it may not be a probable trigger for preventive policy action in any given country. Policymakers may be more likely to look at the behavior of a risk variable over time, and in combination with other variables, than focus on a single threshold in deciding to use macroprudential policy instruments. 
IV. RESPONSE TIME AND INSTITUTIONAL INDICES
There seems to be some correlation between response time and the MaPP index. In particular, the average response time seems negatively correlated with the MaPP index under both Approach 1 and Approach 2 ( Figure 5 ).
15
On the other hand, the correlation is not obvious under Approach 3, but this approach is probably not representative of the sample. Approach 3 includes fewer than half of the countries in the sample and has a much longer average response time because countries that take action before a threshold is breached are excluded. The negative correlation seems to suggest that it is desirable for the central bank to play an important role.
16
The relationship between response time and the MiPP index is less clear. The average response time seems to be negatively correlated with the MiPP index under Approach 1, but a similar result does not hold for Approach 2 or Approach 3. It is therefore unclear whether such a negative correlation exists. While integrating prudential regulation in the central bank has the potential advantage of placing policy decision and tools in the same agency that can 14 The same holds for the rolling 1.5 standard deviation. 15 The column height represents the average response time of countries grouped by their institutional arrangements. 16 See IMF (2013). reduce response time, this advantage would not be achieved if the central bank were not given the decision-making role.
The relationship between response time and the MoF index is also unclear. The correlation seems nonlinear, with response time initially declining but reversing course later. This, however, does not indicate that the participation of the government in the macroprudential policy framework is not important. The fact that the average response time is the longest in the absence of a policy coordinating body (1 in MoF) under all three approaches suggests that the government's involvement can improve the macroprudential policy framework. As noted by the Fund's previous work, participation by government helps garner political support for policy actions, although a stronger role of the government relative to the central bank may increase the risk that short-term political considerations prevail over incentives to contain excessive exuberance in financial markets. Some caution is needed in interpreting the regression results. The sample size is so small that the regression results may be sensitive to small variations in the sample and to the influence of outliers.
MoF index
V. RESPONSE TIME IN A MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS
19
The estimated model is also too simple to identify any causal relationship, and some of the right-hand-side variables may be endogenous. While the institutional indices can be considered exogenous as they reflect the arrangement at the time of policy action, there is no sure way to ascertain that monetary policy is truly exogenous.
The caveats notwithstanding, the regression results seem to confirm the negative correlation between response time and the MaPP index. The estimated coefficients of the MaPP index under both Approach 1 and Approach 2 are negative and statistically significant (Table 2) . They are also similar in size (-2.6 under Approach 1 and -3.1 under approach 2), suggesting that for each increase in central bank involvement, the response time would be reduced by about three months. The result doesn't seem to be sensitive to the inclusion of other independent variables-the estimated coefficients of the MaPP index remain negative and 18 A panel estimation is not possible as response time is not continuous over time. The equation is estimated for Approach 1 and 2, but not for Approach 3 given its small number of observations. The estimation includes 37 countries for which data are available. 19 Given the small sample size, the nonparametric, residual bootstrap method is used to obtain standard errors. The pairs bootstrap is also tried, where data (instead of residuals) are re-sampled to account for possible non-IID errors, but the test results do not change. statistically significant. There seems to be no clear correlation between response time and the other two institutional indices. The estimated coefficients of the MiPP index are statistically insignificant under both approaches, although they have the same sign. This result seems consistent with Figure  4 , indicating that response time may have little to do with whether the supervisory function is integrated in the central bank. Likewise, the estimated coefficients of the MoF index, though both negative, are statistically insignificant, providing inconclusive evidence on the role of the government.
The results are mixed for the control variables. The estimated coefficient of the policy rate change is positive and statistically significant under Approach 1 but not under Approach 2. A positive correlation perhaps indicates that adjusting interest rates reduces the need to use macroprudential instruments early, or country authorities tend to use macroprudential instruments quickly if, for some reason, their ability to conduct monetary policy is constrained.
21
This result provides some evidence, though inconclusive, that coordination between macroprudential and monetary policies is important in addressing risks associated with credit growth. The estimated coefficient of credit-to-GDP is also statistically significant under Approach 1 but not under Approach 2. One possible explanation for the significant coefficient under Approach 1 is that, as credit-to-GDP is used as a proxy for the depth of the financial sector, countries tend to use macroprudential instruments more quickly if the financial markets are less developed. However, when per capita GDP and a few of the Worldwide Governance Indicators are tried in the regression in place of credit-to-GDP, none of the estimated coefficients is statistically significant.
22
Another explanation may be simply that the risk, as represented by credit-to-GDP, becomes greater the longer it takes for policymakers to react.
As a robustness check, an alternative specification with dummy variables is estimated for response time. Equation (a) assumes a particular subjective ranking of the institutional arrangements. To see if the negative correlation still holds even if this ranking does not, the institutional indices are replaced with dummy variables representing the most distinguishing feature of the indices, i.e., which agency is in charge, and the following equation is estimated:
23 (Table 3 ). This confirms the result of the regression on the indices themselves, pointing to the importance of the role of the central bank in the macroprudential policy framework. On the other hand, the estimated coefficients of the dummy variables D 2 , representing the integration of prudential supervision in the central bank, are statistically insignificant under both approaches. Similarly, the estimated coefficients of D 3 are statistically insignificant under both approaches, consistent with the results of the regression on the indices themselves and providing inconclusive evidence on the role of the government. 
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper finds a negative correlation between policy response time and the involvement of the central bank in the macroprudential framework. This seems to indicate that giving the central bank an important role is conducive to reducing policy response time. This finding is consistent with the Fund's position that "the central bank needs to play an important role," the benefit of which has been well documented: 24 the central bank is in a unique position to monitor macrofinancial linkages in its capacity as the monetary policymaker and the supervisor of payments systems; it has the expertise in systemic risk identification and monitoring; and it has the experience in communicating risks to markets and the general public through the publication of a financial stability report.
Monetary policy may affect the timing of the use of macroprudential instruments, although the evidence is inconclusive. The paper's finding of a possible positive correlation between macroprudential policy response time and changes in the policy interest rate suggests that coordination is important between macroprudential and monetary policies. Indeed, the positive correlation seems to suggest that smaller changes in the policy rate may necessitate a quicker response of macroprudential policy to mitigate risks generated by credit growth. While monetary policy should be used as the first line of defense, it is often constrained by a number of factors, including the exchange rate regime, the prevalence of foreign currency lending and an inefficient policy transmission mechanism. In those cases, macroprudential policy would be a useful complement.
A common risk "threshold" that would trigger policy actions probably does not exist. While a threshold estimated from panel data may be useful in raising a "red flag" and analyzing the likelihood of a future financial crisis, this paper finds that policy actions are often taken long before an arbitrary threshold is reached. Rather than taking action when credit growth crosses a certain threshold, policymakers are likely to monitor a range of indicators, including changes in risk variables and market intelligence, in considering policy options.
Policymakers also rely on judgment that cannot be easily captured by the risk variables, and often take action only after a confluence of evidence suggests that action is needed.
Policy response time is only one aspect of an effective macroprudential policy framework. This paper has focused on the time dimension of systemic risk, i.e., how quickly policy has responded to changes in the credit cycle under various institutional arrangements. An effective institutional arrangement, however, should be equally capable of addressing the cross-sectional dimension of systemic risk, i.e., common exposures, linkages, and interdependencies that may be sources of contagion and spillover risks to the whole financial system. In addition, the results of a cross-country study will only hold "on average," and country-specific factors may be important in determining the responsiveness of institutional arrangements. These factors include the quality of supervision, policy coordination mechanisms, and the approach to economic management, which cannot be easily captured in a cross-country study but should be given adequate attention in establishing macroprudential frameworks in individual countries. •The MaPP index: 1 -The financial stability/macroprudential policy mandate is shared by multiple agencies including the central bank, but there is no coordination body, 2 -The mandate is shared by multiple agencies including the central bank, and the central bank is a member of a coordination body, 3 -The mandate is shared by multiple agencies including the central bank, and the central bank chairs the coordination body, and 4 -The central bank, or a committee of the central bank, is the sole owner of the mandate.
•The MiPP index: 1 -The central bank has no regulatory/supervisory functions, 2 -The central bank supervises the banking sector, 3 -The central bank supervises the banking sector and part of the nonbank financial sector, and 4 -The central bank supervises the entire financial sector.
•The MoF index: 1 -There is no macroprudential policy coordination body or the government is not a member, 2 -The government is a member/observer of the policy coordination body, 3 -The government co-chairs the policy coordination body with other agencies, and 4 -The government chairs the policy coordination body.
Note: The indices reflect de facto institutional arrangements, on which information is obtained from the 2010 IMF survey on Financial Stability and Macroprudential Policy, IMF country economists, the authorities' websites, and FSAP reports. 2010: restrictions on foreign ownership reintroduced (foreigners prohibited from buying houses for investment purposes-rental or vacation property; foreigners temporarily residing in Australia are allowed to one house provided they sell it when they leave Australia).
Appendix. Changes in Macroprudential Policy
Mar 2012: Guideline to Strengthen the Sustainability of the Business Models of Large Internationally Active Austrian Banks was introduced (will increase capitalization, strengthen the refinancing structure of banking subsidiaries; to ensure that it is well balanced, the supervisory authority will continually monitor and analyze -based on quarterly data (starting from end-2011) -the ratio of net new lending to local stable funding; ensure that, in the event of crisis, a bank can be reorganized swiftly, effectively and efficiently or, if need be, wound up in an orderly manner, parent institutions are required to submit groupwide recovery and resolution schemes to the supervisory authority by the end of 2012 to prepare for potential crisis situations). vehicle loans between 24 and 36 months contractual maturities with LTV ratio over 80 %) was increased from 100 % to 150 %; Nov 2011: a recalibration of the measure revoked the previous rule and set the risk weights for consumer loan exposures according to the maturity of operations, removing loan-to-value ratio criteria (e.g. 150% for vehicle loans longer than 60 months maturity and 300% for personal loans longer than 60 months maturity). Fixed income foreign capital operations IOF rate (tax) was increased from 2% to 4% and then to 6%; Additionally, IOF rate on the margin requirements for foreign investment on stock exchanges, commodities and futures was increased from 0.38% to 6%, thus requiring the implementation of such measure to all future market operations; Mar 2011: IOF tax rose from zero to 6% for external loans and bond issuances up to 360 days and from 2.38% to 6.38% for credit card company obligation for client's purchase abroad; Apr 2011: 6% IOF rate was extended to external loans and bond issuances up to 720 days; Dec 2011: a 2% IOF tax on equities was eliminated; Mar 2012: a 6 % IOF tax extended on external loans and bond issuances up to 5 years; Jun 2012: the maturity of external loans and bond issuances with the 6% IOF tax was reduced back to 2 years; Dec 2012: the maturity of external loans and bond issuances with the 6% IOF tax was reduced back to 1 years. Other
Brazil Bulgaria
Canada Chile
Loan-to-Value Mar 2004: CMHC "Flex Down" program broadened the eligible sources of funds for the minimum down payment (5%); Mar 2006: CMHC: 0% down payment, 30 years amortizations; April 2007: LTV limit for insured loans increased to 80% (from 75%); October 2008: Maximum LTV for insured loans was reduced (from 100% to 95%) and maximum amortization for new government backed insured mortgages was lowed (from 40 to 35 years); April 2010 : Maximum LTV for refinanced mortgages was lowered (from 95% to 90%) and Minimum down payment on properties not occupied by owner was raised (from 5% to 20%); March 2011: Maximum LTV for refinanced mortgages was lowered (from 90% to 85%) and maximum amortization for new government backed insured mortgages was lowed (from 35 to 30 years); June 2012 (implemented in November): Maximum LTV on HELOCs cut (from 80% to 65%); July 2012: Maximum LTV for refinanced mortgages was lowered (from 85% to 80%) and maximum amortization for new government backed insured mortgages was lowed (from 30 to 25 years).
Aug 2009: the possibility of funding mortgage loans through the issue of a new category of mortgage bill, which finance loans representing more than 75% of the value of the mortgage collateral, up to a limit of 100% (for banks with the highest solvency rating and debtors with the highest credit rating).
Debt Service-to-Income October 2008: New loan documentation required; July 2012: a (fixed) maximum gross debt service ratio and maximum total debt service ratios of 39% and 44%, respectively. : reduce developers' capital requirement for economic and commodity housing investment; 2010: tax incentives reduced; eligibility criteria for land development projects tightened, state-owned enterprises and property development business required to exit the business if not core business; banks are banned from granting loans to speculators; restrictions on foreigners tightened: foreigners (must reside one year) can own only one residential property for their own use; Mar 2013: local governments are told to limit nonresidents from buying more than one home.
Croatia Estonia Finland
Loan-to-Value March 2010: FIN-FSA recommended (not binding) a maximum LTV ratio of 90% and max 25 years of amortization Debt Service-to-Income Capital Requirements/ Risk Weights Jun 2006: Capital adequacy risk weights applied to foreign currency or foreign currencyindexed loans to unhedged borrowers in the non-government sector are increased by 25 percentage points. The existing weights for foreign currency or foreign currency-indexed loans to unhedged borrowers (those without adequate foreign currency incomes/revenues) were increased from 50 percent to 75 percent and from 100 percent to 125 percent; Jan 2008: Introduction of higher (than 12 percent) capital requirements on banks whose growth rate of placements exceeds the maximum permissible growth rate of placements (about 12 percent), proportionate to the share of non-core deposits on the liability side of the balance sheet; risk weights for unhedged borrowers are increased by further 25 percentage points. 
Hong Kong SAR Hungary
Loan-to-Value 1991: Seventy percent LTV ratio for residential mortgages; Jan 1997: LTV for properties with a value of more than HK$ 12 million lowered to 60 percent; Oct 2001: LTV restored to 70 percent; Oct 2009: For residential properties valued at $20 million or more, the LTV ratio is capped at 60 percent; Aug 2010: Applying a maximum LTV ratio of 60 percent to properties with a value at or above $12 million; Lower the maximum LTV ratio for properties which are not intended to be occupied by the owners to 60 percent; Nov 2010: Lowering the LTV ratio for residential properties with a value at HK$12 million or above from 60 percent to 50 percent; Lowering the maximum LTV ratio for residential properties with a value at or above HK$8 million and below HK$12 million from 70 percent to 60 percent, but the maximum loan amount will be capped at HK$6 million; Maintaining the maximum LTV ratio for residential properties with a value below HK$8 million at 70 percent, but the maximum loan amount will be capped at HK$4.8 million; Lowering the maximum LTV ratio for all nonowner-occupied residential properties, properties held by a company and industrial and commercial properties to 50 percent, regardless of property values; Jun 2011: LTV for real estate values Greater than or equal to HK$10 million LTV 50 percent, Greater than or equal to HK$7mn and less than HK$10mn LTV 60 percent, and for properties valued Less than HK$7mn remains the same at 70 percent subject to maximum loan amount of HK$4.2mn; LTV cap lowered by further 10 percentage points for borrowers with main income from outside Hong Kong SAR; LTV cap for net-worth based mortgage loans lowered from 50 percent to 40 percent, irrespective of property value; Sep 2012: Lower the LTV limit to 30 percent for property mortgage loans assessed based on the net worth of mortgage applicants; Lower the applicable loanto-value ratio (LTV) limits by another 10 percentage points for property mortgage loans to mortgage applicants whose income is derived mainly from outside Hong Kong; Feb 2013: the LTV nonresidential properties will be lowered by 10 percentage points.
Mar 2010: The maximum LTV ratio was set at 75, 60 and 45 per cent for forint, euro and other foreign currency loans. The relevant loan-to value limits are somewhat higher for vehicle financing loans and residential real estate leasing (80, 65 and 50 per cent respectively for forint, euro and other foreign currency loans).
Debt Service-to-Income Aug 2010: Standardizing the limit on debt servicing ratios (DSRs) of mortgage applicants to 50 percent, instead of the current range of 50 percent to 60 percent; Sep 2012: Lower the debt servicing ratio (DSR) limit from 50 percent to 40 percent; and the maximum stressed DSR limit from 60 percent to 50 percent. Nov 2010: Special Stamp Duty raised to 15 percent for residential properties resold within first 6 months of purchase; 10 percent for properties resold between 6 months and 12 months; and 5 percent for properties resold between 12 months and 24 months. October 2012: Raise Special Stamp Duty to 20 percent for residential properties resold within first 6 months of purchases; 15 percent for properties resold between 6 months and 12 months; and 10% for properties resold between 12 months and 36 months. October 2012: introduced Buyer's Stamp Duty on residential properties acquired by any person (including a company incorporated) except a Hong Kong Permanent Resident. BSD is to be charged at a flat rate of 15 percent on all residential properties, on top of the existing stamp duty and the special stamp duty, if applicable; Feb 2013: Duties for all transactions exceeding HKD 2 mn will effectively double, taking the maximum rate to 8.5 percent. Below the HKD 2 mn threshold, a flat 1.5 percent duty will be introduced. Other
Banks should stress-test mortgage applicants' repayment ability, assuming an increase in mortgage rates of at least two percentage points, and limit the stressed DSR to a cap of 60 percent; lower the cap on the value of property that can be 
Malaysia Mexico Mongolia
Loan-to-Value Nov 2010: Maximum 70percent LTV limit on the 3rd outstanding housing loan; Dec 2011: residential property loans taken by nonindividual borrowers were also subjected to an LTV ratio of 60 percent. Debt Service-to-Income Mar 2011: The eligibility requirements for credit cards were adjusted (e.g. the requirements for credit cards for individuals earning a monthly gross income of RM3,000 and below; limits were imposed on the number of credit cards and credit limits extended to these individuals). Capital Requirements/ Risk Weights Apr 2005: Risk weights on non-performing residential mortgage loans was increased from 50 to 100percent, Jan 2011: capital charges on banks were increased (to 100percent) for residential property loans with LTVs exceeding 90percent; also risk weights were raised on personal loans with tenure more than 5 years.
2001: Banks have the obligation to deduct from their capital those assets that have no capacity to absorb losses, such as investments in other financial entities. For properties held and disposed within 2 years, the (Real Property Gain Tax) RPGT rate has been raised to 10percent from 5percent. For properties held and disposed within a period exceeding 2 years and up to 5 years, the rate is 5percent. Properties held and disposed after 5 years are not subject to RPGT; 2013: The RPGT for the disposal of properties within 2 years from the date of purchase is raised to 15percent from 10percent and for the disposal of properties within a period of 2-5 years; the rate will increase to 10percent from 5percent. Other 1997: Exposure to property lending was restricted to 20percent; 2012: minimum price for house purchases by foreigners was raised from RM 250,000 to RM 500,000.
Oct 2012: To avoid the transfer of assets and liabilities between banks operating in Mexico and related parties at prices deviating from market values, banks are required to seek previous authorization from the Central Bank of Mexico whenever these transfers exceed 25 percent of basic capital within a year.
Netherlands New Zealand Nigeria
Loan percent for buyers with one or more outstanding housing loans, the minimum cash payment was increased from 5 percent to 10 percent; January 2011: LTVs were lowered to 60 percent for individuals with one or more outstanding loans and to 50 percent for nonindividuals; Oct 2012: An absolute limit of 35 years for all new housing loans; if the loan tenure exceeds 30 years, or the sum of the loan tenure and the age of the borrower exceeds 65 years, the LTV limit will be reduced to 40 percent from 60 percent if the borrower has one or more outstanding housing loans, or reduced to 60 percent from 80 percent if the borrower has no outstanding housing loans; the LTV limit is reduced to 40 percent from 50 percent for new housing loans to entities such as corporations; Jan 2013: LTVs on 2nd and 3rd loan tightened; Feb 2013: The MAS introduced financing restrictions on motor vehicle loans granted by financial institutions (The maximum motor vehicle loan amount will depend on the open market value of the motor vehicle purchased: e.g. for a motor vehicle with OMV of more than $20,000, the maximum LTV is 50 percent); The financing restrictions will not apply to loans for the purchase of commercial vehicles3. They will also not apply to loans for the purchase of motorcycles. 
Tax
Feb 2010: Seller's stamp duty was introduced on all private properties sold within one year of purchase at the rate 1 percent for the first S$180,000, 2 percent for the next 180.000S$ and 3 percent for the remaining balance; August 2010: The SSD was extended to sales within three years of purchase, with rates of 3 percent, 2 percent, and 1 percent depending on the length of the holding period; January 2011: The SSD was extended to sales within four years and rates raised to 16 percent for sales within a year, decreasing gradually thereafter to a minimum of 4 percent in the fourth year; December 2011: A buyer's stamp duty was imposed with a rate of 10 percent on foreigners and corporate entities buying any residential property, and of 3 percent on permanent residents buying second or subsequent residential property or Singapore citizens buying their third residential property; Jan 2013: higher buyer's stamp duty for permanent residents (1st property) and Singapore citizen (2nd property); for industrial properties, seller's stamp duties were introduced; Feb 2013: Some new tax measures were announced in the 2013 Budget, mainly targeted at the non-owner-occupied residential properties (let-out residential properties will be taxed at progressive rates between 10−20 percent as opposed to the flat 10 percent; the revised rates will be phased in over 2 years; removed the property tax refund concession for vacant properties, effective January 2014; The owner-occupied residential properties also had some tax revisions, in particular increasing the progressivity of the property tax system. Other Sep 2009: The interest absorption scheme (which allowed some deferment of principal payments) and interestonly housing loans were disallowed; Caps banks' loan exposures to the property sector (excluding residential mortgages for owner occupation) at 35 percent of total non-bank exposure; 2010: Increased the release of land by the government for property developers in private residential housing market; Jan 2013: public housing measures (maximum floor area capped etc).
Jan 2012: The maximum loan-to-stable-funding (LTSF) ratio of 110 percent was implemented. The FPD's powers to set the countercyclical capital buffer and sectoral capital requirements will not formally kick in until CRD-IV takes effect (expected in early 2014).
Spain
Provisioning Requirement Mar 2010-Mar 2011: banks with CARs above 16percent are allowed to lower their general provisioning rate; Jun 2011: banks with a ratio of consumer loans to total loans above 20percent and banks wit a ratio of NPLs in other consumer loans to total other consumer loans above 8percent had to set aside 4percent or 8 percent general provision.
The FPC's March 2013 recommendation is that banks provision for three-year ahead credit losses and conduct costs.
Foreign Currency Lending Limits
Jun 2009: non FX earnings companies allowed to borrow in FX from local banks, provided that FX loan amount is greater than US$5 million and average maturity date is longer than a year; consumer not allowed to take out FX linked loans.
Credit Growth Limits
Reserve Requirements 
United States Uruguay Vietnam
Loan-to-Value
Debt Service-toIncome Jan 2014: For qualified mortgages the borrower has a debt-to-income ratio no greater than 43%. Jun 2008: Reserve requirement on domestic and foreign currency deposits raised to 25% (from 17%) and 35% (from 25%) respectively; Oct 2009-Jul 2010: reserve requirements on domestic and foreign currency deposits lowered a couple of times reaching 12% on domestic deposits and 15% on foreign; May 2011: prior to May the average reserve requirements (RRs) on domestic and foreign deposits were set according to the maturity of the deposit; average RRs rates on domestic and foreign deposits are set at 15 and 18 percent, respectively, and independently of the maturity of the deposit; marginal RRs are introduced and set at 15 and 27 percent; Jun 2011: reserve requirement on peso deposits raised to 15% (from 12%) and on foreign currency deposits to 18% (from 15% 
